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the State of Utah, is referred to hereafter as "the Division." 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is a review of a final order issued by an 
administrative agency of the State of Utah following a formal 
adjudicative proceeding. This Court has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2a-3(2)(a)(Supp. 1992) 
and 63-46b-16 (1989) . 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Division disagrees with how Nelson has framed the issues 
in her brief. Nelson has also incorrectly identified the 
applicable standard of appellate review for two out of the three 
issues raised on appeal.1 (Br. at 1-3). Therefore, the Division 
submits its own version of the issues presented on appeal and 
will also set forth what the Division believes to be the correct 
standard of review for each issue. 
1
 Rule 24(5) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
requires the appellant to provide a statement of the issues 
presented for review and the standard of appellate review for each 
issue. Nelson raises three issues in her brief. (Br. at 1, 2.) 
Nelson's standard of review section (Br. at 2, 3) characterizes all 
three issues as findings of fact which are to be reviewed by this 
court under the substantial evidence (based on the whole record) 
standard of review. (Br. at 2, 3.) The Division disagrees with 
Nelson's characterization of two out of the three issues as factual 
findings and accordingly will provide its own version of the issues 
as well as the appropriate standard of review for each issue. 
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1. DID THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ABUSE HIS 
DISCRETION BY EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF NELSON'S 
POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION? 
Standard of Review: Appellate review of this issue is 
governed by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (hereafter 
"UAPA"). Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-l to -22 (1989 & Cum- Supp. 
1992). Section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) provides that the court shall 
grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it 
determines that a person seeking judicial review has been 
"substantially prejudiced by any of the following . . . (h) the 
agency action is: . . . (i) an abuse of discretion delegated to 
the agency by statute." The UAPA vests the presiding officer (in 
this instance the administrative law judge, hereafter "ALJ") with 
an explicit grant of discretion to admit or exclude evidence that 
is offered at administrative hearings. Section 63-46b-8(1)(b)(1) 
states that "on his own motion or upon objection by a party, the 
presiding officer: (i) may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, 
immaterial, or unduly repetitious." (Emphasis added). 
The ALJ's ruling excluding Nelson's polygraph evidence was 
made pursuant to his statutory authority to exclude irrelevant 
evidence. Accordingly, this court should defer to the ALJ's 
ruling, which was affirmed on agency review, unless it is found 
to be clearly unreasonable or an abuse of discretion. Accord 
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581, 587 (Utah 
2 
1991)- The ALJ's ruling should be given the same degree of 
deference as would be given a trial court's ruling on a relevancy 
determination under the Utah Rules of Evidence. See State v. 
Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 780 (Utah App. 1991)(trial court has 
"broad discretion to determine whether proffered evidence is 
relevant, and we will find error only if the trial court has 
abused its discretion"); accord State v. Bartlev, 784 P.2d 1231 
(Utah App. 1989) . 
2. IS THE DIVISION'S FINDING THAT NELSON ENGAGED IN 
SEXUAL RELATIONS WITH HER PATIENT, K.G., IN 1985 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE? 
Standard of Review; The Divisions's finding that Nelson 
engaged in sexual relations with K.G. in 1985 constitutes a 
finding of fact and should be reviewed by this court to determine 
whether the finding is supported by substantial evidence "when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court." Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g)(1989); accord King v. Industrial Comm'n, 
No. 920464-CA, slip op. at 5 (Utah App. March 18, 1993). In 
order for Nelson to challenge the Division's finding she must 
first "'marshall the evidence in support of the finding and then 
demonstrate that despite the evidence, the . . . findings are so 
lacking in support' as to be inadequate under the applicable 
standard of review." Heinecke v. Department of Commerce, 810 P.2d 
3 
4 59, 4 64 (Utah App. 1991)(quoting Grace Drilling v. Board of 
Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989)). 
3. WERE THE SANCTIONS IMPOSED BY THE DIVISION AGAINST 
NELSON UNREASONABLE IN LIGHT OF HER UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR? 
Standard of Review; The Division has an explicit grant of 
discretion to impose a broad range of disciplinary sanctions 
against licensees who are found in violation of the statutes and 
rules governing their profession. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-1-
6(3)(7), -15, and 58-35-11 (1990). The court should review the 
Division's decision (as modified by the Department) to impose a 
disciplinary sanction under the abuse of discretion standard of 
review. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g)(h)(i) (1989). 
Therefore, this court should affirm the Division's sanction 
unless it is found to be "clearly unreasonable or otherwise an 
abuse of discretion." Johnson Bowles Co. v. Division of 
Securities, 829 P.2d 101, 115 (Utah App.)(explicit grant of 
discretion vested in executive director to impose sanctions for 
violations of securities law reviewed under abuse of discretion 
standard of review), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). 
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah Admin. Rule R153-35-5 (1987-88)2 
(B) The Social Worker's Ethical Responsibility to Clients. 
(1) Primacy of Client's Interests. The social 
worker's primary responsibility is to clients. 
(d) The social worker should avoid relationships or 
commitments that conflict with the interests of 
clients. 
(e) The social worker should under no circumstances 
engage in sexual activities with clients. 
The following statutory provisions are found in Addendum A 
of this brief. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-6 (1990) 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-15 (1990) 
Utah Code Ann. §58-35-11 (1990) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l (1989) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1989) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1992) 
2
 The administrative rules cited in this brief have remained 
unchanged since 1981. For the convenience of the court, the 
Division cites to the 1987-88 rules because that was the first year 
administrative rules were published in the Utah Administrative 
Code. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
At all times relevant to this case, Nelson has been licensed 
to practice as a licensed clinical social worker and as a 
certified social worker. (R. 67.) In 1989, the Division 
investigated Nelson based on a complaint that she engaged in 
sexual relations with a male client, K.G., in 19 85. (Tr. Vol. 1 
at 30). On April 14, 1990, a notice of agency action and 
petition was served on Nelson. (R. 986-991.) On November 13, 
1991, a formal hearing commenced before the Board of Social Work 
("Board") which lasted three days. (R. 6 6.) 
As a result of that hearing, the Board found that Nelson 
violated Rules of Ethical Conduct R153-35-5(B)(1)(d) and (e) by 
engaging in sexual activity with a client and also by being 
involved in a relationship or commitment that conflicted with the 
best interests of her client. (R. 74-78.) The Board recommended 
that Nelson's licenses be revoked. However, the Board 
recommended that the revocation be stayed in favor of a three-
year suspension of Nelson's license as a clinical social worker, 
and a one-year suspension of her license to practice as a 
certified social worker. (R. 79.) The Board recommended that 
Nelson submit to individual therapy for an indeterminate length 
of time with a therapist that the Board approved and that she 
meet with the Board every six months. The Board further 
6 
recommended that Nelson complete nine quarter hours of course 
work in the areas of professional values and ethics, human growth 
and development and clinical practice procedures. (R. 80.) 
Moreover, the Board recommended that following Nelson's 
suspension, she not be permitted to engage in private practice 
and that her practice be supervised by another licensed clinical 
social worker who was approved by the Board and who reported 
directly to the Board. (R. 80.) The Board's recommended order 
was subsequently approved and adopted by the Division Director, 
David E. Robinson, on January 10, 1992. (R. 65, Addendum B.) 
Nelson sought agency review of the Division's order with the 
Department. (R. 9.) David Buhler, then serving as the Executive 
Director of the Department of Commerce, modified the Division's 
order by reducing to six months the terms of suspension on 
Nelson's licenses. Buhler also ordered that after the conclusion 
of said suspensions, the licenses be placed on three-years' 
probation. Buhler also modified the Division's order by allowing 
Nelson to return to private practice if she successfully 
completes probation. (R. 16-17, Addendum C.) Petitioner then 
filed her petition for review of the Department's order imposing 
the modified sanctions. (R. 16-7.) 
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Nelson is presently under no restriction to practice social 
work because of this court's order staying the effect of the 
sanction until the conclusion of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Division's main witness, K.G., sought counseling in 1981 
at the Summit County Prevention Center for problems associated 
with depression and suicidal ideation. (R. 67.) Nelson, who 
worked at the center, was assigned to provide counseling for K.G. 
(R. 67.) K.G. continued to seek counseling with Nelson 
intermittently from 1981 to 1985. (R. 67.) 
In August, 1984 Nelson left Summit County and began private 
practice. (R„ 120.) In September 1984, K.G. contacted Nelson and 
expressed a desire to continue treatment with Nelson but 
indicated that he wasn't sure he could afford it. According to 
Nelson, she offered to allow K.G. to provide her with windsurfing 
lessons in exchange for some of the treatment. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 
533-35.) The Board found that this bartering agreement was not 
well defined and that it was unprofessional in that it created a 
social relationship. (R. 74.) It also found that it fostered 
dependency in K.G. and reflected Nelson's failure to manage the 
therapeutic relationship and draw proper client/therapist 
8 
boundaries. (R. 75.) The Board concluded Nelson's actions 
conflicted with K.G's best interests. (R. 75.) 
Between September 4, 1984, and July 18, 1985, Nelson 
provided 41 hours of counseling in 33 sessions. (R. 67.) In 
return, K.G. paid Nelson $530 and provided 1-2 ski lessons and 3-
6 windsurfing lessons. (R. 67.) By July 18, 1985, K.G. still 
owed Nelson over $1,700, exclusive of the cash and lessons. (Tr. 
Vol. 4 at 700.) However, according to Nelson, she never asked 
K.G. for payment and she instructed her billing company not to 
bill him. (Tr. Vol. 4 at 700.) 
K.G.'s now ex-wife, Ruth Fata, testified that K.G. saw 
Nelson often, that he did not always make regular appointments 
and that Nelson would make time for him whenever he called. (Tr. 
Vol. 2 at 304.) In 1985, K.G. and Fata were experiencing marital 
problems and jointly went to Nelson, who provided marital 
counseling. (R. 69.) Fata testified that K.G. was very dependent 
on Nelson. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 315.) Both K.G. and Fata testified 
that during one session Nelson advised them to "split the 
sheets," which they interpreted to mean that they should get a 
divorce. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 178, Vol. 2 at 302.) No further marital 
counseling was provided to K.G. and Fata by Nelson. Shortly 
after the session, K.G. told Nelson that the marriage was 
deteriorating and that he and Fata were separating and filing for 
9 
divorce. (R. 7 0.) K.G. and Fata were divorced shortly 
thereafter. Fata testified that she believed that Nelson's 
counseling was partly responsible for the failure of the 
marriage. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 319-20.) The Social Work Board 
concluded that Nelson's marital counseling was improper in 
several respects and that she failed to promote the best 
interests of K.G. and his wife. (R. 76.) 
After separating from his wife, K.G. continued counseling 
with Nelson. Nelson and K.G. went skiing and windsurfing 
together several times as part of the bartering arrangement 
between Nelson and K.G. (R. 68, 69.) Nelson's minor son and 
daughter went along to the windsurfing lessons and Nelson fixed 
picnic lunches. (R. 69.) Nelson testified that the atmosphere 
during the windsurfing lessons was business-like and nonromantic. 
(Tr. Vol. 4 at 658.) However, her son testified that his mother 
hugged and kissed K.G. on at least one* of these outings. (Tr. 
Vol. 4 at 741.) K.G. testified that the atmosphere of the 
lessons was social, friendly and like a date. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 
181. ) 
Between June 10, 1985, and July 8, 1985, K.G. was depressed, 
hopeless and suicidal. (R. 70.) The last in-office therapy 
session was conducted July 18, 1985, after which Nelson began 
seeing K.G. socially outside of the office. (R. 70.) Nelson 
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claimed that therapy had ended on July 18, 1985 and that she had 
discussed the termination of therapy with K.G several times. (Tr. 
Vol. 3 at 582.) K.G. testified that before September 1985 Nelson 
never told him therapy was over. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 182.) K.G. also 
testified that, just prior to September 1985, therapy in Nelson's 
office declined in frequency because he was seeing Nelson more 
often in a social setting. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 183.) K.G. further 
testified that he did not consider the social nature of their 
meetings to signify an end to the therapeutic relationship 
because Nelson continued to discuss therapeutic issues while they 
were together. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 183.) 
Nelson's therapeutic records (R. 118.) did not reflect that 
therapy was terminated on July 18, 1985. (R. 70, 118.) Several 
expert witnesses testified that a therapist's notes should 
reflect a formal termination of therapy. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 142, Vol. 
3 at 454, Vol. 4 at 762.) Two of Nelson's own witnesses, both 
social workers, testified that Nelson's clinical notes did not 
reflect that therapy had been terminated. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 456, 
Vol. 4 at 769.) The Board concluded that Nelson failed to use 
proper procedures to terminate a therapist/client relationship. 
(R. 77.) The Board also found that credible evidence supported 
its finding that Nelson did not inform K.G. that their 
client/therapist relationship was terminated on July 18, 1985, 
11 
and that there was no evidence that K.G. believed his therapy 
with Nelson was terminated. (R. 71.) 
Between August and early September 1985, Nelson saw K.G. 
socially on a number of occasions. (R. 71.) In September 1985, 
K.G. and Nelson spent a week-long vacation together in Hawaii at 
Nelson's condominium. (R. at 71, 7 2.) According to K.G., they 
had sexual reflations, confined to oral intercourse, his first 
night there. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 185.) K.G. testified that they 
continued to have oral sex during the week's visit. According to 
K.G., Nelson insisted that their sexual activity be confined to 
oral sex and not actual intercourse because she was not divorced. 
(Tr. Vol. 1 at 185-6.) The Board found that "Tbiased on the more 
credible evidence presented, Respondent [Nelson] and K.G. slept 
together and periodically engaged in conduct which was sexually 
intimate in nature. While no intercourse occurred, rNelson 1 and 
K.G. did engage in oral sex . . . ." (R. 7 2.) (Emphasis added). 
The Board also noted that they found K.G.'s testimony more 
credible than Nelson's. (R. 7 8.) 
K.G. testified that, after he and Nelson had sexual 
relations, Nelson informed him she would no longer be able to see 
him at her office. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 186-7.) The Board found that 
in going to Hawaii with K.G., Nelson had assumed undue 
12 
responsibility for K.G.'s general welfare and that her behavior 
conflicted with K.G's best interests. (R. 77.) 
K.G's brother, Kent G., testified that he spoke with K.G. on 
a frequent basis in the fall of 1985. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 472.) 
According to Kent G., K.G. told him in the fall of 1985 that he 
was having a sexual relationship with Nelson. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 473, 
474.) Ruth Fata testified that when she spoke with K.G. in 
November 1985, he told her that he had stopped seeing Nelson 
because Nelson had told him that she loved him and was leaving 
her husband for him. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 307.) The Board noted that 
they found the testimony of Kent G. and Fata credible. (R. 7 8.) 
Kathy Lavitt, who met K.G. in the fall 1985, also testified that 
K.G. told her he had recently had a sexual relationship with his 
therapist. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 153.) 
From late October 1985 until the fall of 1988, K.G. did not 
have any further contact with Nelson. (R. 7 2.) K.G. and Nelson 
met again in 1988. (R. 78.) Letters were exchanged between 
Nelson and K.G., and they spoke occasionally. (Tr. Vol. 4 at 
802.) According to Nelson, in the middle of May 1988 she began 
to see K.G. socially, and they began having sexual relations. 
(Tr. Vol. 4 at 805-6.) During this same period, Nelson testified 
that she asked K.G. to come with her on a visit to Nelson's 
therapist in order to discuss their relationship. (Tr. Vol. 4 at 
13 
807.) According to K.G., during this visit, Nelson discussed her 
feeling that K.G. had abandoned her in 1985. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 202.) 
In May or June 1989 K.G. invited Nelson to travel to Oregon 
where K.G. was to visit friends. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 195.) One of 
K.G's friends, Carlton Stubing, testified that in Oregon Nelson 
told him she and K.G. had a prior involvement and that she was 
fearful that he would abandon her. (Tr. Vol, 3 at 484, 490.) 
After Nelson left Oregon, she wrote several letters to K.G. 
proclaiming her love for him. (R. 89-99.) Shortly thereafter, 
K.G. returned to Utah and admitted himself into the Western 
Institute for Neuropsychology ("WIN"), for depression, suicidal 
tendencies, and substance abuse. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 105.) While at 
WIN, K.G. reluctantly disclosed his past sexual and therapeutic 
relationship with Nelson to his therapist at WIN, Peter Brown 
("Brown"). (Tr. Vol. 1 at 109.) Because a sexual relationship 
between a therapist and patient violates the social worker's 
ethical standards, Brown told K.G. that, if K.G. did not report 
the relationship to the Board, he would be obligated to report 
Nelson. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 115.) After K.G. made the report, Brown 
made a follow-up call to the Board. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 116.) Brown 
testified that the relationship between Nelson and her client was 
unethical and unhealthy and that he was gravely concerned about 
the effect the relationship had on K.G. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 114.) 
14 
Brown also testified that he felt the relationship contributed to 
K.G.'s problems. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 120.) 
The Board concluded that Nelson had engaged in highly 
questionable practices in her counseling of K.G. (R. 78.) The 
Board also felt that Nelson's professional performance reflected 
numerous deficiencies. (R. 79.) The Board decided that Nelson's 
conduct with K.G. warranted a severe sanction because of the 
"extreme degree of Respondent's departure from generally accepted 
ethical standards" and the "adverse consequence which resulted 
from that misconduct." (R. 79.) (Emphasis added). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The ALJ's decision to exclude as irrelevant evidence, 
Nelson's polygraph examination, which should be afforded 
deference by this court, was not unreasonable. The ALJ's ruling 
is consistent with the established principle in this state that, 
absent a stipulation from the parties, polygraph evidence is per 
se inadmissible in a court of law. This approach has been 
consistently affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court. No stipulation 
existed between Nelson and the Division to admit the polygraph 
evidence at the hearing. Because of the unreliability and 
prejudicial nature of polygraph evidence, the ALJ did not abuse 
his discretion when he excluded Nelson's polygraph results. The 
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reasons for excluding polygraph evidence, i.e., its lack of 
scientific reliability and its undue prejudice in comparison to 
its probative value, are not obviated simply because the 
proceeding is in an administrative forum where the evidentiary 
standards are more relaxed than those used in courts. Licensing 
boards are equally susceptible to the inherent problems of 
polygraph evidence. Accordingly, the ALJ's ruling was not an 
abuse of discretion. 
Moreover, Nelson cannot make the requisite showing that she 
was "substantially prejudiced" by the ALJ's decision, even if it 
was unreasonable, because the polygraph results are not in the 
record. 
Nelson next challenges the Division's factual finding that 
in September 1985 she engaged in sexual relations with her 
client, K.G., while they were together on a vacation in Hawaii. 
This finding, first made by the Board, was expressly adopted by 
the Division and then affirmed by the Department of Commerce on 
agency review.3 
3
 The proceeding below involved three decisions. First, the 
Board heard the evidence and issued its recommended findings of 
fact, conclusion of law, and order. The recommended findings, 
conclusion and order were then approved and adopted by the Division 
Director, David E. Robinson. The decision then became the 
Division's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order. 
Subsequently, the Division's findings, conclusions and order were 
reviewed by the Executive Director of the Department of Commerce on 
agency review. He modified one of the* Division's findings and its 
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The Division's finding has not properly been challenged by 
Nelson in this appeal• Nelson has not met her burden to marshall 
all the evidence both in support of, and contrary to, the 
Division's finding. Nelson has failed to marshall critical 
evidence that both corroborated the testimony of K.G., the 
Division's chief witness, and further bolstered the Division's 
finding. Nelson's failure to marshall the evidence bars her from 
challenging the finding. Accordingly, this court should affirm 
the Division's finding as supported by substantial evidence. The 
evidence presented at the formal adjudicative proceeding, when 
viewed in light of the whole record, shows that substantial 
evidence supports the Division's finding and further demonstrates 
the extent to which Nelson has not adequately marshalled the 
evidence in this appeal. 
Aside from the finding that Nelson engaged in sexual 
relations with a client, the Board and the Division also found 
that Nelson's general conduct in relation to K.G. was violative 
order imposing sanctions. Cf. La Sal Oil Company, Inc. v. 
Department of Envtl. Quality, 202 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah App. Dec. 
18, 1992). The Division's order here was a final order and not 
merely a recommended order that was acted upon by the Department. 
Reference to La Sal is to made to avoid confusion over which 
decision is being reviewed on appeal. Here, the Division's 
decision (as modified by the Department) is the final order for 
purposes of this court's review. 
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of the ethical standards of social work. Nelson has not 
challenged any of the Division's findings with respect to the 
other ethical violations cited by the Division which, standing 
alone, would justify the disciplinary sanction imposed against 
Nelson, 
Nelson challenges the severity of the sanction imposed by 
the Division, which was subsequently modified by the Department 
of Commerce on agency review. The Division is given broad 
discretion to impose disciplinary sanctions against social 
workers who violate the statutes and rules that apply to that 
profession. The sanction ultimately imposed by the Department 
should be affirmed unless this court finds it to be unreasonable 
and, thus, an abuse of discretion. Nelson does not correctly 
identify the standard of review on this issue but merely argues 
that the facts do not warrant the sanction imposed by the 
Department. Nelson concedes she made bad decisions with respect 
to K.G. in 1985, but attempts to argue mitigation because she has 
not had any complaints brought against her since 19 85. Nelson's 
argument does not justify overturning the sanction because no 
abuse of discretion has been shown. Nelson's behavior towards 
K.G. was egregious and inexcusable. The record as a whole 
supports the sanction that was imposed against Nelson. Nelson 
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has not shown that the sanction imposed against her is an abuse 
of discretion warranting reversal or modification by this court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE ALJ DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION BY 
EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF NELSON'S POLYGRAPH 
EXAMINATION. 
Nelson challenges the ALJ's ruling (R. 180-193) to exclude 
evidence of Nelson's polygraph examination on the basis that the 
ruling "is not consistent with the somewhat relaxed rules of 
evidence that apply at administrative proceedings." (Br. at 11.) 
The ALJ's authority to make this ruling is provided for in 
section 63-46b-8(1)(b)(1), which gives the ALJ an explicit grant 
of discretion to exclude irrelevant evidence. Because the ALJ is 
given an explicit grant of discretion to exclude irrelevant 
evidence, the appellate standard of review for this issue is 
governed by section § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i). Accordingly, this 
court should grant relief to Nelson only if it concludes that the 
ALJ's decision was an abuse of discretion or was beyond the 
"bounds of reasonableness," and that Nelson was substantially 
prejudiced as a result. King, slip op. at 5. 
Nelson has not established, let alone argued, that the ALJ 
abused his discretion by excluding her polygraph evidence. 
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Moreover, Nelson has not shown and cannot show that she suffered 
substantial prejudice as a result of the ALJ's ruling because 
there is no evidence in the record (or any citation to a proffer) 
that would show that the polygraph evidence, had it been 
admitted, would have favorably affected the outcome of 
proceedings below. Consequently, there are two good reasons why 
the court should deny Nelson's requested relief in this appeal. 
1. THE ALJ'S RULING WAS REASONABLE BECAUSE, 
AS UTAH COURTS HAVE HELD, POLYGRAPH EVIDENCE 
IS SCIENTIFICALLY UNRELIABLE AND UNDULY 
PREJUDICIAL. 
Polygraph evidence has consistently been deemed as 
incompetent, scientifically unreliable and unduly prejudicial 
evidence by Utah courts. See State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 37 
(Utah 1989)("a stipulation between the State and the accused is 
presently required for the admission of polygraph test results"); 
accord State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 397-98 (Utah 1989); State 
v. Rebetrano, 681 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1984); State v. Abel, 600 P.2d 
994 (Utah 1979) . 
There was no stipulation between the Division and Nelson to 
admit the results of her polygraph examination. Consequently, 
the ALJ did not abuse his discretion by excluding Nelson's 
polygraph evidence because his ruling correctly adheres to the 
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current state of the law dealing with polygraph evidence as 
articulated by the Utah Supreme Court. 
While Nelson recognizes the current rule governing the use 
of polygraph evidence in criminal and civil proceedings, (Br. at 
11), Nelson urges that a different rule should apply to 
administrative proceedings because of the relaxed evidentiary 
standards of such proceedings. (Br. at 12.) Although strict 
adherence to the Utah Rules of Evidence is not required in 
administrative proceedings, see Tolman v. Salt Lake County, 818 
P.2d 23, 28 (Utah App. 1991), there is no justification for a 
variation in the Utah rule simply because the polygraph evidence 
is offered in an administrative proceeding. The underlying 
rationale for the Utah rule requiring exclusion of polygraph 
evidence absent a stipulation, i.e., scientific unreliability and 
undue prejudice, is not abrogated because the evidence is used in 
an administrative proceeding. Simply put, polygraph evidence is 
not more reliable and less prejudicial because it is used in an 
administrative proceeding. 
In Eldredqe, the Utah Supreme Court explained that "the 
reason for this rule is that polygraph data has not been shown to 
be sufficiently reliable to justify the tendency of a fact finder 
to be overawed by the test results and too willing to abdicate 
its difficult truth-finding function to an expert and his or her 
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machine." 733 P.2d at 37 (citing State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1209, 
1212 (Utah 1987)); Abel, 600 P.2d at 998). Because the present 
status of polygraph evidence remains unchanged, there is no 
reasonable justification for allowing it to be admitted into 
evidence at an administrative proceeding. The risk that a 
license board would be overawed by the test results and abdicate 
its fact finding function to a polygraph machine is the same that 
exists in a jury or bench trial4 in a criminal or civil 
proceeding. 
Numerous cases from other jurisdictions have consistently 
upheld the exclusion of polygraph evidence in administrative 
hearings. For example, in Thangavelu v. Department of Licensing 
and Regulation, 386 N.W. 2d 584, 587 (Mich. App. 1986), the 
Michigan Court of Appeals held that a hearing officer's decision 
in a license revocation proceeding not to admit the results of a 
complainant's polygraph test was not an abuse of discretion. See 
also Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Wittmaack, 522 A.2d 522 
(Pa. 1987) (polygraph evidence held inadmissible in bar 
disciplinary proceeding because polygraph evidence is not 
scientifically reliable and lacked objective trustworthiness). 
A
 The Division could not find any authority that would 
indicate a variation in the rule depending on whether the polygraph 
evidence was being offered before a judge or a jury. The inherent 
problems with polygraph evidence require the same result in either 
case. 
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The Supreme Court of California also ruled that polygraph 
examination evidence is inadmissible in a state bar disciplinary 
proceeding, absent a stipulation• Arden v. State Bar of 
California, 739 P.2d 1236, 1241 (Cal. 1987); see also Kaske v. 
Board of Fire and Police Commissioners, 450 N.E.2d 314 (111, 
1983) . 
Whether polygraph evidence is offered as evidence in an 
administrative hearing or court trial, it is unreliable and 
inherently prejudicial and must be excluded absent a waiver or 
stipulation to its admissibility. The ALJ's ruling to exclude 
this evidence was not an abuse of discretion. 
2. NELSON CANNOT SHOW SHE WAS SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICED 
BY THE EXCLUSION OF THE POLYGRAPH RESULTS BECAUSE THAT 
EVIDENCE IS NOT IN THE RECORD BEFORE THIS COURT. 
Nelson has not shown that the ALJ's ruling to exclude her 
polygraph evidence was an abuse of discretion. Moreover, even if 
the ALJ's ruling is found to be an abuse of discretion, Nelson is 
still required under section 63-46b-16(4) to demonstrate that she 
was "substantially prejudiced" as result of the exclusion of the 
polygraph evidence. The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted 
section 63-46b-16(4)'s "substantial prejudice" test as the same 
standard used for determining whether harmless error has occurred 
in judicial proceedings. Morton, 814 P.2d at 584. An error is 
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considered harmless if "it is sufficiently inconsequential that 
. . . there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected 
the outcome of the proceedings." Id. 
No analysis under the substantial prejudice standard can be 
initiated in this case because the content of the excluded 
polygraph evidence has not been made part of the record. Nelson 
has not tried to argue substantial prejudice, nor can she argue 
that the exclusion of the polygraph evidence was prejudicial 
because it is not part of the record. Without the excluded 
evidence itself or an adequate proffer of it contents, this court 
cannot determine whether there was substantial prejudice, even if 
it concluded that the polygraph results should have admitted at 
the administirative hearing. See Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, 621 
P.2d 1240, 1243 (Utah 1980); Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakenev 
Corp., 578 P«2d 1286, 1288 (Utah 1978). 
Nelson has not shown that the ALJ abused his discretion, nor 
can she show that the exclusion of the polygraph evidence 
resulted in substantial prejudice. Accordingly, this court is 
unable to grant Nelson relief under section 63-46b-16(4). 
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II. 
NELSON'S FAILURE TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE 
PRECLUDES HER FROM CHALLENGING THE DIVISION'S 
FINDING THAT SHE ENGAGED IN SEXUAL RELATIONS 
WITH K.G.. 
The only factual finding Nelson contests on appeal is the 
Division's finding that she engaged in sexual relations with K.G. 
in 1985 while Nelson and K.G. were in Hawaii. (Br. at 15.) 
The Division's factual finding should be reviewed by this court 
to determine whether the finding is supported by substantial 
evidence "when viewed in light of the whole record before the 
court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g)(1989). Accord King, 
slip op. at 5 (Utah App. March 18f 1993). As the appellant, 
Nelson has the burden to marshall the evidence "'in support of 
the findings and then demonstrate that despite the evidence, the 
. . . findings are so lacking in support' as to be inadequate 
under the applicable standard of review." Heinecke, 810 P.2d at 
464 (citing Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68) (emphasis in the 
original). The marshalling requirement imposes a "heavy burden" 
on the appellant. Id. 
Nelson has ignored or simply failed to understand her burden 
on this appeal to marshall all of the evidence that supports or 
contradicts the Division's finding on this factual issue. 
Nelson's statement of facts (Br. 5-10) and her argument (Br. 15-
17) is unquestionably one-sided and appears to be an attempt to 
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portray K.G.'s testimony in a negative light while 
overemphasizing Nelson's testimony and self-serving version of 
events. Nelson overlooks or ignores critical portions of 
evidence that both support the Division's finding and rebut 
Nelson's testimony. Because she has failed to marshall all of 
the evidence that supports the Division's finding, Nelson is 
barred from challenging the Division's finding. Accordingly, the 
court should affirm the Division's finding and conclusion that 
Nelson engaged in unethical conduct by engaging in sexual 
relations with a client in 1985. 
The burden of marshalling the evidence does not lie with the 
Division. However, because Nelson has not marshalled the 
evidence, the Division is compelled to demonstrate briefly for 
this court that there is substantial evidence in the record that 
supports the Division's finding. 
1. THE DIVISION'S FINDING THAT NELSON 
ENGAGED IN SEXUAL RELATIONS WITH K.G. IS 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
The Division found that Nelson engaged in sexual relations 
with K.G. in September of 1985 while they were still involved in 
a client/therapist relationship. The Board's recommended order 
states, "Based on the more credible evidence presented, 
Respondent and K.G. slept together and periodically engaged in 
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conduct which was sexual in nature. While no intercourse 
occurred, Respondent and K.G. did engage in oral sex, . ." (R. 
72)(emphasis added). The Division's finding supported the 
conclusion that Nelson violated Utah Administrative Codef R153-
35-5(B)(l)(e)(1987-88). 
Nelson argues that the "sole basis" for the Division's 
finding that Nelson engaged in sexual relations with K.G. in 1985 
was K.G.'s testimony. (Br. at 15). Nelson claims that K.G.'s 
testimony does not support the Division's finding because the 
Board partially rejected K.G.'s description of what took place at 
Hawaii. (Br. at 16.) Nelson urges that the Board's statement to 
the effect that "there is a lack of credible evidence to find 
that the conduct of took place as specifically described by 
K.G.," is inconsistent with its finding that credible evidence 
supported the fact that K.G. and Nelson engaged in sexual 
relations in 1985. (Br. at 16.)5 
Although the question of credibility between the respective 
testimonies of K.G. and Nelson is important because only K.G. and 
5
 In Nelson's brief at page 14, Nelson directs the court's 
attention to the unique "details" of K.G.'s testimony (which the 
Board found was not supported by credible evidence) concerning the 
sexual relationship that transpired in Hawaii in 1985. The Board's 
statement to the effect that did not believe K.G.'s version of 
events in their entirety does not preclude them from finding that 
there was sufficient evidence to conclude that sexual relations did 
in fact occur. 
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Nelson had actual knowledge of what transpired in Hawaii, Nelson 
fails to account for the fact that the Board found K.G.'s 
testimony to be more credible than her own.6 (R. 7 8.) While the 
Board did not completely credit K.G.'s account of occurred at 
Hawaii, that does preclude the Board from finding that sexual 
relations occurred while Nelson and K.G. spent the week together 
in Hawaii in 1985. 
K.G.'s testimony was corroborated by several witnesses who 
had independent recollection of conversations with K.G. in 1985 
concerning K.G.'s sexual relationship with Nelson. Nelson claims 
that Board erred in finding that K.G.'s testimony was 
corroborated by the testimony of K.G.'s brother and ex-wife 
because K.G. testified that he told no one of his sexual 
involvement with Nelson until 1990. Nelson has mischaracterized 
K.G.'s testimony. On cross-examination, K.G. was asked, "Isn't 
it true that you never told anybody the details of this alleged 
sexual encounter until 1990?" K.G. responded, "It wouldn't 
6
 The Board did not find Nelson's testimony to be credible in 
most respects. For example, the Board did not believe Nelson's 
testimony (Tr. Vol. 3 at 582) that she had ended the 
client/therapist relationship with K.G. before the Hawaii trip. (R. 
71.) The Board also heard Nelson's own minor son testify that he 
saw Nelson and K.G. kissing and hugging on at least two occasions 
at Nelson's home and when Nelson went windsurfing with K.G. (Tr. 
Vol. 4 at 736, 741). This was contrary to Nelson's testimony (Tr. 
Vol. 3 at 606, 612, 617) that there was no hugging, kissing, or 
intimate physical contact between K.G. and herself in 1985. (R. 
72. ) 
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surprise me at all if I hadn't." (Tr. Vol. 2 at 261.) K.G. did 
not testify that he had not discussed his sexual involvement with 
anyone until 1990. His response to the question can only be 
properly characterized as a lack of recollection of discussing 
the "details" of his sexual involvement with Nelson in Hawaii. 
The question put to K.G. was phrased in general terms. If K.G. 
had been asked whether he discussed his sexual involvement with 
his brother or his ex-wife, a totally different response may have 
been given. 
K.G.'s brother, Kent G., (Tr. Vol. 3 at 474), his ex-wife, 
Fata, (Tr. Vol. 2 at 306-308), and Kathy Lavitt all testified 
that K.G. told them in 1985 that he had a sexual or a romantic 
relationship with his therapist in 1985. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 153.) 
Another witness, Stubing, testified that Nelson told him in 1989 
that she had a prior involvement with K.G. and was afraid that 
K.G. would abandon her again. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 484, 490.) Nelson's 
failure to marshall evidence relative to the testimony of Fata, 
Kent G., Lavitt and Stubing exemplifies how Nelson has not met 
her burden on this appeal. 
In addition, there is other evidence that corroborates 
K.G.'s testimony and supports the Division's finding that Nelson 
engaged in a sexually intimate relationship with K.G. in 1985/ 
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including several letters Nelson wrote to K.G. between 19 88 and 
1989 that were admitted into evidence. (R. 82-99.)7 
The letters, coupled with the corroborating testimony of the 
Division's witnesses, support the Division's finding that Nelson 
engaged in sexual relations with K.G. in 1985. While the 
testimony of the corroborating witnesses does not go directly to 
the finding that sex occurred during the Hawaii trip, the 
testimony does lend credence to K.G.'s testimony that Nelson's 
relationship with K.G. in 1985 transcended the bounds of a 
professional therapeutic relationship and became a sexually 
intimate and romantic relationship. The evidence, when viewed in 
light of the whole record, shows that substantial evidence 
supports the Division's finding. 
These letters are never mentioned by Nelson in this appeal. 
The letters were critical to the Division's case to show that the 
relationship that existed between Nelson and K.G. in 1985 was 
sexually intimate or romantic in nature. For example, the first 
letter, dated October 21, 1988, was written after Nelson had not 
seen K.G. since October of 1985. (Tr. Vol. 4 at 778.) The letter 
was written to K.G. after K.G. dropped out of sight for a period of 
three years. This letter corroborates K.G.'s testimony that the 
relationship he had with Nelson in 1985 went beyond the 
client/therapist relationship and turned to a romantic and sexual 
one. The next letter written by Nelson to K.G. was dated December 
19, 1988. (R. 85.) This letter also corroborates K.G.'s testimony. 
In that letter Nelson, referring back to 1985, writes, "Although I 
have many more feelings and thoughts about our 'relationship' I 
just couldn't bring myself to risk by expressing them." (R. at 85-
86.) (quotes in original). The letters were important to the 
Division's case and were used to corroborate K.G.'s testimony 
concerning the sexual relationship that transpired between Nelson 
and K.G. in 1985. 
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2. EVEN IF THERE WAS NO FINDING THAT NELSON ENGAGED IN 
SEXUAL RELATIONS WITH HER CLIENT K.G. IN 1985, NELSON 
STILL ENGAGED IN UNETHICAL CONDUCT TOWARD HER CLIENT 
THAT WARRANTS THE SANCTION IMPOSED. 
Ignoring, for the sake of argument, the Division's finding 
that Nelson engaged in sexual relations with K.G. in 1985, the 
Board still found other instances of unethical conduct that 
Nelson committed while acting as K.G.'s therapist. Nelson has 
elected not to challenge those findings and conclusions. 
The Division found that Nelson violated Utah Administrative 
Code Rule 153-35-5(B)(1)(d), which provides that "the social 
worker should avoid relationships or commitments that conflict 
with the interests of clients." The Board found that Nelson 
"engaged in unethical conduct violative of R153-35-5(B)(1)(d) in 
various instances." (R. 74.) The non-sex related violations were 
just as serious as the violation of the rule prohibiting sexual 
relations with a client. For example, the Board found that 
Nelson engaged in unethical behavior by the nature of the 
bartering agreement between Nelson and K.G. While the bartering 
agreement was not viewed as being unethical per se, the Board 
found that the bartering agreement was not well defined and that 
it created a social relationship between K.G and Nelson (R. 74, 
75.) The Board also found that the nature of the bartering 
agreement conflicted with K.G.'s best interests and reflected on 
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Nelson's "failure to manage the therapeutic relationship in such 
a way as that the proper boundaries of that relationship were 
clearly understood by the client." (R. 75.) 
The Board also concluded that, because of the extended 
therapeutic relationship between K.G. "coupled with the 
inappropriate bartering agreement," Nelson "failed to promote the 
best interests of the marriage between K.G. and his wife." (R. 
76.) The Board found that Nelson should not have provided joint 
marital counseling and that "the nature of the therapy she did 
provide was not consistent with the interests of both clients." 
(R. 76.) 
Finally, even ignoring the sexual involvement that occurred 
in 1985 in Hawaii, the fact that Nelson went to Hawaii with her 
client was clearly unethical and demonstrates Nelson's 
unprofessional conduct towards K.G. which, according to the 
Board, conflicted with K.G.'s best interests. (R. 78.) 
III. 
THE SANCTION AGAINST NELSON WAS REASONABLE IN 
VIEW OF THE EGREGIOUS NATURE OF NELSON'S 
UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR. 
The Division's order and the Department's subsequent 
modification of the Division's order on agency review, are set 
forth in this brief as Addendum Items B and C. The sanction 
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imposed should not be disturbed by this court unless Nelson shows 
that it is clearly unreasonable or otherwise an abuse of 
discretion. Johnson Bowles Co,, 829 P.2d at 115. 
In her brief at pages 18-20, Nelson challenges the 
Department's suspension of her license to practice social work on 
the grounds that the sanction imposed is unduly harsh and 
unjustified. Nelson asks this court to nullify the suspension in 
its entirety. (Br. at 21.) 
The Division finds Nelson's argument on this issue 
confusing. Nelson states: 
Assuming arguendo that Licensee Nelson did allow a 
social relationship to exist with K.G. after she had 
stopped seeing him in her office, that would provide a 
basis for discipline. Similarly, the bartering 
agreement, due to its vague nature and personal service 
aspects, may also provide a basis upon which the 
Division could sanction Licensee. Nonetheless, 
Licensee urges this court to find that the sanctions 
imposed by the division are unduly harsh given her 
conduct. 
(Br. at 20.) All assuming at this point is over, since the 
Division did find that Nelson developed a social and sexual 
relationship with K.G. (R. 72.) Moreover, the Division found 
that, as a result of Nelson's unprofessional conduct, K.G. was 
adversely impacted "in his ability to trust therapy and 
subsequently obtain counseling from other therapists." (R. 73.) 
Nelson concedes that she made a "poor decision" to meet K.G. 
in Hawaii and "allowed the social relationship with K.G. to 
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exceed the appropriate boundaries." (Br. at 21.) Based on what 
the Division found and what Nelson admits to, a six-month 
suspension coupled with the conditions imposed against Nelson 
does not rise to an abuse of discretion. Nelson's conduct 
towards K.G., when viewed in its entirety, manifests an egregious 
departure from the ethical and professional standards of social 
work. As a licensed mental health professional, Nelson was in a 
position of trust and control. She blatantly abused that trust 
and engaged in a relationship with K.G that was clearly unethical 
and adverse to K.G.'s best interests. 
In addition, the fact that Nelson's unprofessional conduct 
occurred in 1985 does not justify a lesser sanction. See Rogers 
v. Division of Real Estate, 790 P.2d 102, 107 (Utah App. 1990) 
(license revocation of real estate broker in December 1988 for 
1982 conduct not unduly harsh, even where licensee had no further 
complaints against her). Consequently, the sanction that was 
imposed against Nelson was reasonable, was not an abuse of 
discretion, and should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this court should lift the stay and 
affirm the Department's final order suspending Nelson's licenses 
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to practice as a certified and clinical social worker and 
imposing other terms and restrictions against her licenses. 
Submitted this / v V / day of the April, 1993. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Utah Code Ann, § 58-1-6 (1990): 
The duties, functions, and responsibilities of the 
division include, but are not limited to, the 
following: 
(3)taking administrative and judicial action against 
persons in violation of the laws and rules administered 
and enforced by the division, including, but not 
limited to, the issuance of cease and desist orders; 
(7) issuing, refusing to issue, revoking, suspending, 
renewing, refusing to renew, or otherwise acting upon 
any license or licenseef•] 
Utah Code Ann- § 58-1-15 (1990): 
The division may refuse to issue or renew, and may 
suspend or revoke the license of any licensee who: 
(1) is or has been guilty of unprofessional conduct, as 
defined by statute or rule[.] 
Utah Code Ann. §58-35-11 (1990): 
The division may refuse to renew, or may suspend or 
revoke any license issued under this chapter upon 
proof, after a hearing, that the licensee has engaged 
in unprofessional conduct. As used in this chapter, 
"unprofessional conduct" includes, but is not limited 
to: 
(6)being found guilty of unprofessional conduct by the rules 
established by the Division, 
Utah Code Ann, § 63-46b-l (1989). Scope and applicability of 
chapter: 
(1) Except as set forth in Subsection (2), and except 
as otherwise provided by a statute superseding 
provisions of this chapter by explicit reference to 
this chapter, the provisions of this chapter apply to 
every agency of the state of Utah and govern: 
(a) all state agency actions that determine the legal 
rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal 
interests of one or more identifiable persons, 
including all agency actions to grant, deny, revoke, 
suspend, modify, annul, withdraw, or amend an 
authority, right, or license; and 
(b) judicial review of all such actions. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8 (1989). Procedures for formal 
adjudicative proceedings - Hearing procedure 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3(d)(i) 
and (ii), in all formal adjudicative proceedings, a 
hearing shall be conducted as follows: 
(b) On his own motion or upon objection by a party, the 
presiding officer: 
(i) may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, 
immaterial, or unduly repetitious; 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1989). Judicial review - Formal 
adjudicative proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the 
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final 
agency action resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency 
action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, 
the petitioner shall file a petition for review of 
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in 
the form required by the appellate rules of the 
appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate 
court shall govern all additional filings and 
proceedings in the appellate court. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on 
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied 
the law; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of 
fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not 
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light 
of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency 
by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless 
the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts 
and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis 
for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals 
from the district court review of informal adjudicative 
proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service 
Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, 
Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state 
engineer[.] 
ADDENDUM B 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF 
TERESA L. NELSON 
TO PRACTICE AS A CERTIFIED AND 
CLINICAL SOCIAL WORKER 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
O R D E R 
Case No. OPL-90-26 
The attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommended Order are hereby adopted by the Director of the 
Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing of the State of 
Utah. Respondent's licenses are thus suspended, effective thirty 
(30) days from the date of this Order. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the suspended licenses, both wall 
and wallet sizes, as well as the embossed certificate, thus be 
surrendered to the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing. 
Dated this /O^ day of January, 1992, 
tCL.,.j&<£t '7 






Native review of this Order may be obtained by 
i£tfest for agency review with the executive director of 
g^ iitent within thirty (3 0) days after issuance of this 
Any such request must comply with the requirements of the 
Code Ann. 63-46b-12(l) and R151-46b-12 of the departmental 
which govern agency review. 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF : FINDINGS OF FACT 
TERESA L. NELSON : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
TO PRACTICE AS A CERTIFIED AND : AND RECOMMENDED ORDER 
CLINICAL SOCIAL WORKER : 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH : CASE NO. OPL-90-26 
Appearances: 
Melissa M. Hubbell for the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing 
Suzanne M. Dallimore for Respondent 
BY THE BOARD: 
Pursuant to notice duly served by certified mail, a hearing 
was conducted in the above-entitled matter on November 13-14, 
1991 and was then resumed and completed on December 4, 1991 
before J- Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for the 
Department of Commerce, and the Board of Social Work Examiners. 
Board members present for the hearing were Eugene Gibbons, Ann M. 
Talbot, Patricia Gamble-Hovey, Jennifer Bartell and Mary 
Bearnson. David E. Robinson, the Director of the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing, was also present. 
Thereafter, evidence was received. During the first day of 
the hearing, Ms. Gamble-Hovey was recused from further 
participation in both the hearing and subsequent deliberation by 
the Board in this proceeding. The Board, being fully advised in 
the premises, now enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Respondent is, and at times relevant to these 
proceedings has been, licensed to practice as a certified and 
clinical social worker in the State of Utah. The record does not 
reflect when Respondent was licensed as a certified social 
worker, although she was employed in that capacity at the Summit 
County Prevention Center in 1980 and subsequently became the 
director of that facility. Respondent obtained her license as a 
clinical social worker in 1983, she left the Center in June 1984 
and then commenced a full-time private practice as a clinical 
social worker with Affiliated Psychotherapists. 
2. Commencing sometine late in 1981, Respondent provided 
counseling to a client, referred to herein as K.G., for problems 
associated with depression, suicidal ideation, alcohol and 
substance abuse. Counseling continued for a number of months, 
often on a weekly basis, and charges for Respondent's services 
were based on a sliding fee schedule. Given his limited 
financial ability, K.G. was required to make only nominal 
payments for Respondent's services. K.G. subsequently left 
treatment sometime in 1982 and he married in 1983. 
3. On September 4, 1984, K.G. commenced treatment with 
Respondent, who provided approximately forty-one (41) hours of 
counseling over thirty-three (33) sessions with K.G. through July 
18, 1985. Those sessions addressed K.G.'s alcohol abuse, major 
depressive episodes, dysphoric mood, loss of interest and energy, 
feelings of hopelessness and worthlessness, diminished ability to 
think or concentrate, indecisiveness, suicidal ideation and his 
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recurrent thoughts of death. 
4. Between December 7, 1984 and April 9, 1985, K.G. paid 
Respondent a total of $530 as partial compensation for the 
therapy sessions. When K.G. had resumed counseling with 
Respondent in 1984f they agreed he would subsequently provide ski 
and windsurfing lessons to Respondent as compensation for her 
services. Beyond the above-stated cash payments, Respondent and 
K.G. apparently understood that one ski or windsurfing lesson 
would be exchanged for each therapy session. 
5. When Respondent and K.G. agreed to barter their 
servicesf Respondent normally charged $55 for a one (1) hour 
session. No discussion occurred between Respondent and K.G. as 
to what the latter would normally charge for lessons he would 
providef no common understanding existed as to the duration of 
their bartering agreement and Respondent believed the lessons she 
received from K.G. would only operate to pay for some of her 
counseling services. 
6. Respondent had previously bartered her services with two 
other clients to obtain a single ski lesson on one occasion and, 
in other instance, piano lessons for her children. In each case, 
the value of the respective services to be exchanged was 
initially discussed between Respondent and her client and each 
party to the agreement understood the extent of services which 
would be bartered. 
7. Between September 4, 1984 and July 18, 1985, K.G. 
provided Respondent with 1-2 ski lessons and 3-6 windsurfing 
lessons. During one of the ski lessons, K.G. provided little -
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if any - instruction on skiing techniques to Respondent, he spoke 
to Respondent of family ski outings with his parents when he was 
a child and generally considered the time he spent with 
Respondent during the lesson as similar to that of a therapy 
session. As she testified during this proceeding, Respondent's 
interaction with K.G. at that time was consistent with the 
Rogarian approach she might use in therapy sessions with a 
client. 
8. K.G. is a certified windsurfing instructor and has 
offered such lessons to other individuals. Respondent's two 
children often accompanied her and K.G. when the latter provided 
windsurfing lessons. Respondent usually brought a picnic lunch 
on those occasions. Such conduct created a social atmosphere 
unlike that present during windsurfing lessons K.G. has offered 
to other individuals at other times. 
9. During therapy sessions in early 1985, K.G. periodically 
informed Respondent of conflicts with his wife, who was initially 
reluctant to participate in marriage counseling. During two 
sessions in February 1985, K.G. told Respondent his wife had 
agreed to start such counseling and he expressed hope his 
marriage would continue. 
10. On February 26, 1985, Respondent met only with K.G.'s 
wife. Respondent then held two co-joint counseling sessions on 
March 5 and 19, 1985. Respondent believed many unalterable 
conflicts existed in the marriage and she inquired of both K.G. 
and his wife if they had considered obtaining a divorce. Based 
on the credible evidence presented, both K.G. and his wife 
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believed Respondent had thus suggested they should be divorced. 
No further co-joint sessions were conducted. During K.G.'s next 
session on April 9, 1985f Respondent noted K.G.'s marital 
relationship appeared to be deteriorating, K.G. told Respondent 
he was depressed and informed her that he was considering a 
divorce. 
11. During the next counseling session on May 28, 1985f 
K.G. informed Respondent that he and his wife were separated and 
filing for a divorce. When K.G. also told Respondent he was 
depressedf she decided to commence hypnosis and utilize age 
regression techniques to obtain more information regarding K.G.'s 
lack of nurturing and his ability to self-nurture. 
12. Respondent used hypnosis and age regression techniques 
during eight (8) counseling sessions with K.G. between May 31, 
1985 and July 18, 1985. During a June 10, 1985 session, K.G. 
expressed sadness regarding his divorce and indicated he felt 
empty and suicidal. During a July 8, 1985 session, Respondent 
related he had attempted suicide the night before his wife left 
and he was tired of not feeling good. He also expressed a sense 
of hopelessness, sadness and frustration. 
13. The last formal therapy session Respondent provided to 
K.G. was conducted in her office on July 18, 1985. Respondent 
used hypnosis during that session, she noted K.G. lacked 
direction in his career goals and he was chemically more stable. 
Respondent recommended K.G. continue with his existing 
medication. Clinical notes from Respondent's records do not 
reflect she terminated K.G. as a client at that time. 
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14. Based on the more credible evidence presented, 
Respondent did not inform K.G. the client/therapist relationship 
was terminated on July 18, 1985 and there is no evidence K.G. 
believed his status as a client ended after that therapy session. 
Based on the more credible evidence, and given the relatively 
indefinite manner in which Respondent had obtained compensation 
for the services she had provided to K.G. since September 1984, 
there was no agreement between them to end his therapy based on 
any concern he would be unable to pay for ongoing treatment. A 
review of Respondent's clinical notes does not reflect K.G. had 
progressed in counseling as to no longer require therapy. 
15. Between mid-August 1985 and early-September 1985, 
Respondent and K.G. socialized on three occasions. Specifically, 
they played tennis and K.G. twice visited Respondent at her home. 
During that second visit in early September 1985, Respondent 
informed K.G. she was leaving for a vacation in Hawaii on 
September 15, 1985. There is a lack of sufficient evidence to 
find that Respondent invited K.G. to join her. However, 
Respondent told K.G. she would be staying in a condominium while 
there, she informed him of both the length of her trip and her 
scheduled departure and further indicated she would have access 
to a rental car. 
16. A few days prior to her departure for Hawaii, K.G. 
informed Respondent he had purchased an airline ticket and 
inquired if he could join her. Respondent agreed, she arrived in 
Hawaii on September 15, 1985 and met K.G. at the airport when he 
arrived that same day on a subsequent flight. They stayed in 
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Hawaii for approximately one week and spent a majority of their 
time together. Based on the more credible evidence presented, 
Respondent and K.G. slept together and periodically engaged in 
conduct which was sexually intimate in nature. While no 
intercourse occurred, Respondent and K.G. did engage in oral sex, 
although there is a lack of credible evidence to find that such 
conduct took place as specifically described by K.G. during the 
instant proceeding. 
17. Respondent and K.G. left Hawaii on separate flights. 
During the following month until late-October 1985, they were 
together on four additional occasions. Specifically, Respondent, 
her two children and K.G. had dinner at Respondents home in 
late-September 1985, K.G. arrived drunk and unannounced at 
Respondent's home one night, they met at a soccer game 
approximately one week later and they also had dinner at a 
restaurant in late-October 1985. Based on the more credible 
evidence, Respondent and K.G. briefly kissed and hugged at least 
one of those occasions, but they did not engage in any sexual 
activity other than what had occurred in Hawaii during the 
previous month. 
19. Respondent and K.G. had no contact of any nature from 
late-October 1985 until the fall of 1988 and their 
client/therapist relationship ceased to exist after late-October 
1985. Based on the more credible evidence presented, that 
relationship did not resume at any time during subsequent contact 
which occurred between Respondent and K.G. from the fall of 1988 
through mid-1989. 
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20. K.G. obtained outpatient alcohol rehabilitative 
treatment for three weeks in Oregon during mid-1989* On July 31, 
1989, K.G. commenced inpatient therapy at the Western Institute 
of Neuropsychiatry in Utah to address both his alcohol dependency 
and a suicide attempt. K.G. was subsequently referred to another 
therapist for further counseling and he has been receiving such 
therapy during the past two years. 
21. Based on the credible evidence presented, K.G. has 
blamed himself for the relationship which existed with 
Respondent, he has been somewhat traumatized by his recollection 
of certain aspects of that relationship and he encountered some 
difficulty in subsequently discussing that relationship with 
other therapists. Given his feelings of guilt, betrayal and 
self-condemnation, K.G. was adversely impacted - to some degree -
in his ability to trust therapy and subsequently obtain 
counseling from other therapists. This record does not reflect 
the current state of K.G.'s mental health or the degree of 
progress he may have realized in counseling during the past two 
years with his present therapist. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Respondent acknowledges she exercised poor judgment when she 
allowed K.G. to join her in Hawaii. However, Respondent contends 
she never engaged in any conduct which conflicted with K.G.'s 
interests and she did not misuse her professional relationship as 
his therapist for her own personal gain. Respondent further 
asserts their client/therapist relationship ceased prior to the 
Hawaiian vacation and did not subsequently resume. Respondent 
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thus urges no basis exists to enter any disciplinary sanction as 
to her license* 
Section 58-35-11, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, 
provides the Division may suspend or revoke the license of a 
certified or clinical social worker if the licensee has engaged 
in unprofessional conduct. Section 58-3 5-11(6) defines 
unprofessional conduct to include a violation of rules 
established by the Division. R153-35-5(B)(1) generally sets 
forth that the social worker's primary ethical responsibility is 
to clients. That rule further provides: 
(d) The social worker should avoid 
relationships or commitments that conflict 
with the interests of clients. 
(e) The social worker should under no 
circumstances engage in sexual activities 
with clients. 
Respondent engaged in unethical conduct violative of R153-
35-5(B)(1)(d) in various instances. The Board initially notes 
that, while Respondent agreed to exchange counseling services for 
lessons from K.G., the bartering of her services does not - in 
and of itself - constitute unprofessional conduct within the 
meaning of R153-35-5(B)(1)(d). However, it is evident the 
agreement between Respondent and K.G. was not well defined and no 
clear understanding existed as to the scope and duration of that 
agreement. 
Further, the agreement between Respondent and K.G. was not 
typical of bartering agreements Respondent had made with other 
clients. It is particularly disturbing that Respondent agreed 
to receive a direct personal service from K.G., the nature and 
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duration of which established a social relationship between them. 
On at least one occasion during a lesson, Respondent and K.G. 
interacted in a manner similar to that which had occurred during 
any given therapy session. Such conduct was not congruent with 
either K.G.'s or Respondent's role in a mere instructor/ student 
relationship. The resulting dual relationship which existed 
necessarily presented some confusion to K.G. 
Moreover, given K.G.'s existing problems with alcoholism and 
Respondent's diagnosis of his mental condition, it is critically 
significant she failed to understand and appreciate K.G. would 
thus tend to develop increasing dependency on her as his 
therapist. The nature of the bartering agreement between 
Respondent and K.G. also fostered such dependency and reflects 
Respondent's further failure to manage the therapeutic 
relationship in such a way that the proper boundaries of that 
relationship were clearly understood by the client. 
Had Respondent carefully evaluated K.G.'s condition, she 
would have properly understood the nature of the dynamics he 
brought to the therapy relationship and she should have 
necessarily avoided engaging in pleasureable activities with K.G. 
in a socialized setting. There is no evidence Respondent acted 
with malicious intent to K.G.'s detriment or that her conduct was 
only self-serving in nature. However, Respondent either did not 
adequately evaluate or she disregarded the nature of K.G.'s 
condition and thus interacted with him in a manner which 
conflicted with his best interests. 
Given the extended duration of therapy Respondent had 
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provided to K.G. prior to early 1985f coupled with the 
inappropriate bartering agreement which existed, Respondent also 
failed to promote the best interests of the marriage between K.G. 
and his wife. They could have reasonably understood Respondent 
had advised them to obtain a divorce. While Respondent did not 
intend to direct them toward such action, the counseling she 
offered to them was ambiguous and she should have scrupulously 
avoided any uncertainty as to whether she was advising them to 
end their marriage. 
The nature of co-joint counseling Respondent offered was 
particularly disconcerting to K.G.'s wifef who was also her 
client and had informed Respondent she wanted her marriage to 
remain intact. K.G.'s wife was aware of the existence and nature 
of the bartering agreement between K.G. and Respondent. Such 
knowledge caused her to reasonably believe that an alliance and 
socialization existed between Respondent and K.G. which, in turn, 
hindered her ability to candidly discuss marital problems with 
Respondent toward possible improvement in her marriage. Under 
such circumstances, Respondent should not have provided any co-
joint marriage counseling and the nature of the therapy she did 
offer was not consistent with the interests of both clients. 
Given K.G.'s dependency on Respondent as his therapist, he 
perceived the contact between them which arose from the bartering 
agreement to be beneficial to him in a therapeutic sense, even 
though Respondent may not have either recognized or intended that 
result. However, the enhanced dependency created by the nature 
of the bartering agreement was not proper. Furthermore, the 
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continuing interaction between Respondent and K.G. which occurred 
in social settings after July 18, 1985 improperly tended to 
sustain K.G. in a therapeutic sense and confirmed his ongoing 
belief that a client/therapist relationship continued to exist. 
All credible evidence suggests that no basis existed to 
terminate the just-stated relationship in mid-July 1985, no such 
termination actually occurred and, in light of his condition at 
that time, it would have not been in K.G.'s best interest to 
terminate that relationship. Ironically, Respondent should have 
continued to provide formal therapy to K.G. after July 18, 1985 
rather than precipitously terminate therapy sessions in an office 
setting and continue on-going contacts with K.G. elsewhere. 
Had Respondent intended to unmistakably end K.G.'s status as 
a client in mid-July 1985, she had the responsibility to utilize 
proper procedures to terminate that relationship. Respondent 
clearly failed to do so. Her clinical notes do not corroborate 
her claims that K.G. desired to end therapy, that therapy for him 
was no longer warranted or that any other proper basis existed to 
end the client/therapist relationship. Further, her testimony in 
that regard is not persuasive. 
Given all of the foregoing, it is not surprising K.G. wanted 
to accompany Respondent to Hawaii and it is entirely regrettable 
Respondent consented to that joint vacation. Based on 
Respondent's testimony as to the motivation for her acquiescence 
in that regard, she had clearly assumed undue responsibility for 
K.G.'s general welfare. Thus, Respondent's inability or 
unwillingness to avoid cross-tranference with K.G. also 
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conflicted with his best interests. 
Sparing detail, Respondent also violated R153-35-5(B)(1)(e). 
The Board initially notes that K.G.'s conduct in relationships 
with other individuals reflects a degree of situational ethics 
and dishonesty. The Board further recognizes the somewhat self-
serving nature of Respondent's testimony, particularly given the 
nature of this proceeding and possible consequences as to her 
Licensure. However, based on credible testimony offered by 
K.G.'s brother and ex-wife which tends to corroborate K.G.'s 
testimony, and a considered assessment of the respective 
credibility of both K.G. and Respondent, the Board concludes that 
physically intimate sexual activity occurred while they were in 
Hawaii. 
Thus, an appropriate basis exists to enter a disciplinary 
sanction with respect to Respondent's ability to practice as a 
certified and clinical social worker in this state. Commendably, 
Respondent has adjusted the nature of her practice in certain 
respects as a result of her experience with K.G. as a client. 
Specifically, Respondent no longer offers counseling to single 
male clients other than in a family setting, she does not permit 
home visits by clients and she thus recognizes certain boundary 
issues and the need to avoid creating inappropriate levels of 
dependency between herself and clients. Further, there is no 
evidence Respondent has engaged in unprofessional conduct with 
respect to other clients. 
Despite the foregoing, Respondent did engage in highly 
questionable clinical practices with regard to the counseling she 
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offered to K.G. The nature of the numerous deficiencies in 
Respondent's professional performance reflects the need for 
additional education of a remedial nature. Respondent's conduct 
also periodically conflicted with the best interests of both K.G. 
and his ex-wife in various respects. Thusf an appropriately 
severe sanction should enter to reflect the extreme degree of 
Respondent's departure from generally accepted ethical standards 
which govern her profession and with due regard for the adverse 
consequences which resulted from that misconduct. 
RECOMMENDED ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Respondent's licenses to 
practice as a certified and clinical social worker in the State 
of Utah be revoked. 
It is further ordered that a stay of enforcement enter as to 
the just-stated revocation, Respondent's license as a clinical 
social worker shall be suspended for three (3) years and her 
license as a certified social worker shall be suspended for one 
(1) year, effective thirty (30) days from the date this 
Recommended Order may be adopted by the Director of the Division 
of Occupational and Professional Licensing. The suspension of 
Respondent's licenses is subject to the following terms and 
conditions: 
1. Respondent shall receive individual 
therapy from either a psychologist, 
psychiatrist or clinical social worker who 
has been licensed in that capacity and 
continuously so employed for at least the 
last five (5) years. At a minimum, such 
therapy shall address Respondent's ethical 
violations, her responsiblity for that 
conduct, the manner in which her codependency 
may have contributed to her misconduct and 
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proper procedures necessary to manage a 
client/therapist relationship. 
2. Within thirty (30) days from the date 
this Recommended Order may be adopted, 
Respondent shall submit the name of the 
above-referenced therapist for Board review 
and possible approval. Thereafter, 
Respondents therapist shall submit written 
reports to the Board every six (6) months as 
to the nature of therapy provided to 
Respondent and her progress in that regard. 
Therapy shall continue until such time as 
Respondent's therapist informs the Board it 
is no longer warranted and the Board 
recommends that therapy may cease. 
3. Respondent shall meet with the Board 
during the next regularly scheduled Board 
meeting held after this Recommended Order may 
be adopted. Thereafter, Respondent shall 
meet with the Board every six (6) months 
during the terms of suspension set forth 
herein. The frequency of such meetings may 
be subsequently modified, as deemed warranted 
by the Board. 
4. Respondent shall complete coursework 
which addresses the subjects of professional 
values and ethics, DSM - IIIf human growth 
and development, and clinical practice 
procedures. Within thirty (30) days from the 
date this Recommended Order may be adopted, 
Respondent shall submit an education program 
for Board review and approval, which provides 
a minimum of nine (9) quarter hours to be 
completed in that respect. 
5. Upon satisfactory completion of the 
above-stated terms and conditions and the 
expiration of the one (1) year suspension of 
Respondent's license as a certified social 
worker, Respondent may practice in that 
capacity in an agency setting, but may not 
engage in private practice. Respondent's 
employment shall be subject to supervision by 
a licensed clinical social worker. 
Respondent shall provide prior written notice 
to the Board of any such employment and her 
prospective supervisor in that regard. Upon 
Board review and approval, such employment 
may commence and Respondent's supervisor 
shall submit written reports to the Board 
every six (6) months as to the nature of 
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Respondent's duties and her performance in 
that regard. 
Should Respondent fail to comply with the above-stated terms 
and conditions or otherwise violate any statute or rule which 
governs her practice as a social worker in the State of Utahf 
further proceedings shall be conducted and a determination made 





DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES 
OF TERESA L. NELSON TO PRACTICE 
AS A CERTIFIED AND CLINICAL 
SOCIAL WORKER IN THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ORDER ON REVIEW 
CASE NO. OPL-90-26 
INTRODUCTION 
By order dated January 10, 1992 (the "Order") , the Director of 
the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing of the Utah 
Department of Commerce (the "Division") adopted the findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and recommended order of the Utah Board 
of Social Work Examiners (the "Board"). The Order followed a 
hearing on a petition filed by the Division requesting sanctions 
against the license of Teresa L. Nelson ("Respondent") to practice 
as a certified social worker and as a clinical social worker. 
The Order revoked Respondent's licenses to practice as a 
certified social worker and as a clinical social worker. The 
revocations were stayed subject to certain conditions, among them: 
that Respondent's license as a clinical social worker be suspended 
for three years, and the license as a certified social worker be 
suspended for one year; that Respondent receive therapy; that she 
complete an education program; and that upon reinstatement of her 
license to practice as a certified social worker she not practice 
in-a private setting. 
Respondent filed a request for agency review, and the Division 
filed a response thereto. Respondent was represented by an 
attorney at the hearing and also in her request for review. In 
connection with review, Respondent seeks the following remedies: 
1. that the portions of the Recommended Order providing for 
a three-year suspension of Respondent's license as a clinical 
social worker, and a one-year suspension of her license as a 
certified social worker, be reversed and instead, that an order 
enter permitting Respondent to continue to practice; 
2. that paragraph 1 of the Recommended Order provide for 
counselling of Respondent for only one year, rather than until the 
Board recommend that it cease; and 
3. that paragraph 5 of the Recommended Order (that 
Respondent may not, after the one-year suspension of her certified 
social worker's license, engage in private practice) be reversed. 
STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW 
The review of this matter is being conducted by the Executive 
Director of the Department of Commerce pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
Section 63-46b-12, and Rule 151-46b-12 of the Rules of Procedure 
for Adjudicative Proceedings before the Department of Commerce. 
THE ISSUES REVIEWED 
1. Whether excluding certain evidence at the hearing 
(results of a polygraph) unfairly denied Respondent the right to 
present credible evidence on her own behalf; 
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2. Whether the Board based its findings on an issue (alleged 
adverse impact on a witness caused by Respondent's conduct) which 
was not properly before it, where evidence on that issue had been 
excluded by a prior order of the Administrative Law Judge; 
3. Whether certain facts upon which the Board relied were 
not supported by the evidence; and 
4. Whether the sanctions imposed are unduly harsh or 
otherwise unfair. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The following findings of fact in the Recommended Order 
are contested by Respondent: 
a. that there was a sexual relationship during 1985 
between Respondent and K.G., Respondent's patient for a time 
and a witness at the hearing; and 
b. that K.G. had developed a dependency upon 
Respondent. 
2. As to the existence of a sexual relationship, if any, 
between Respondent and K.G. during 1985, the Board considered 
testimony that such relationship did exist, from K.G., from K.G.'s 
brother, and from K.G.'s ex-wife. It considered testimony that 
there was no such relationship from Respondent. The Administrative 
Law Judge declined to allow evidence from a polygraph examination 
of Respondent which, Respondent argues, would have tended to 
support her testimony. Respondent asserts that the "most credible 
evidence" would have been the polygraph. Respondent does not point 
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out why the evidence from the client and others is not credible, 
nor does she offer convincing evidence or arguments that polygraph 
results are more credible than testimony from witnesses. 
3. As to whether the client had developed a dependency on 
Respondent, Respondent argues that findings of fact on this point 
are not supported by the evidence. Respondent offered no 
transcript but merely asserted this point in the request for 
review. The Order made no specific findings of fact regarding 
K.G.'s dependency upon Respondent. The Conclusions of Law stated 
in part that: 
Moreover, given K.G.'s existing problems with alcoholism 
and Respondent's diagnosis of his mental condition, it is 
critically significant she failed to understand and appreciate 
K.G. would thus tend to develop increasing dependency on her 
as his therapist. The nature of the bartering agreement 
between Respondent and K.G. also fostered such dependency and 
reflects Respondent's further failure to manage the 
therapeutic relationship in such a way that the proper 
boundaries of that relationship were clearly understood by the 
client. [Order, p. 10; italics added.] 
Given K.G.'s dependency on Respondent as his therapist, 
he perceived the contact between them which arose from the 
bartering agreement to be beneficial to him in a therapeutic 
sense, even though Respondent may not have either recognized 
or intended that result. However, the enhanced dependency 
created by the nature of the bartering agreement was not 
proper. [Order, p. 11; italics added.] 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. With respect to whether excluding polygraph evidence was 
unfair to Respondent, I conclude that the decision of the 
Administrative Law Judge excluding the evidence should be upheld. 
Although the rules of evidence in administrative proceedings are 
meant to be flexible and less formal than the Utah Rules of 
- 4 -
Evidence, and therefore admitting polygraph evidence may have been 
permissible, the decision to deny the evidence was reasonable under 
the circumstances. The state offered precedent that polygraph 
evidence is insufficiently credible and that such evidence may be 
denied admission in the administrative forum. In addition, the 
Order was based on sufficient evidence other than that germane to 
the polygraph -- e.g. whether or not there was a sexual 
relationship at a specific time and place. Although the Board 
found sufficient evidence to support the finding that a sexual 
relationship actually occurred, even if it had not there was still 
sufficient evidence and findings to support a penalty. Aside from 
the sexual relationship, the Order found that Respondent had 
improperly socialized with the client; had not properly terminated 
the patient-therapist relationship; engaged in behavior which 
conflicted with the patient's best interests; had improperly 
conducted joint counselling with the patient and his wife; and 
otherwise failed to act in the patient's best interest. 
2. Respondent asserts that adverse impact on the patient --
primarily that he became dependent upon Respondent -- was 
improperly considered by the Board. As to whether the client had 
become dependent upon Respondent, reading the quoted language from 
pages 10 and 11 of the Order, (see Findings of Fact, above, at 
paragraph 3) , it appears that the Order went from what could happen 
to assuming that it did happen. As there are no specific findings 
of fact regarding dependency, that portion of the Order concluding 
that K.G. was in fact dependent upon Respondent is overturned. 
- 5 -
Even if the issue of adverse impact on the client was improperly 
before the Board it appears that the Order is supported by 
sufficient findings aside from this point. Although the issue of 
impact was addressed in the Order, it was only briefly raised. 
Rather, the Board found that Respondent exercised poor judgement 
with respect to the trip to Hawaii; she engaged in a social 
relationship and other conduct which conflicted with the best 
interests of her client; she did not adequately terminate the 
professional relationship prior to beginning a personal 
relationship; her conduct constituted unprofessional conduct within 
the meaning of Rule 153-35-5(B). From the terms of the order, it 
appears that these items were given much more weight than any 
adverse impact on K.G. and that these items were sufficient to 
support a sanction against Respondent's license. The Order clearly 
indicates that the reasons for the sanction are the actions of 
Respondent, rather than their effect on someone else. As noted 
above, the impact, if any, on the client, even if not admissible is 
a relatively minor portion of the decision. 
3. The sanctions entered are within the Board's authority. 
Both Section 58-1-15 and Section 58-35-11 allow the Board to deny, 
suspend, revoke or place on probation a license where the licensee 
has been guilty of unprofessional conduct. Based on Respondent's 
own admissions, she clearly exercised poor judgement and allowed 
the relationship to expand beyond what is appropriate professional 
conduct. While there is sufficient evidence that a sanction is 
warranted, the penalty imposed by the Board seems unduly harsh in 
- 6 -
view cf p e n a l t i e s f i l t e r e d in j i m i l a r c a s e s . A t h r e e y p a r 
s u s p e n s i o n rn tv rv unaoanona r l t , [ a r t i ui u n ai a^n MM* a ;;pat MI 
h " 1 htj | ioSaa-- J t imo rt i Lti in- ot tier c o m p l a i n t s i g a m c t 
Respondent o t h e r t h a n t h i s one, and t h e t a c t t h a t t h e r e does 11 o to 
a p p e a r t o be a s i q m f i c a n t i 1 t MM nnhMa IMMH h mil , OeM . 
4 . In a d d i t i o n , i mi | o r t i u u <>f t h e o r d e r needs 
'1 ar i t i c a t i o n I d r a g r a p h l n | t pe o r d e r i \ open-ended II 
p r o v i d e s t h a t upon nat iaOin t i a ) anmpJiM IIIII MI I MJ piuljdi JI 11 mini i 
lit I i.xaiio and a, hdj Lions l i s t e d , and t h e e x p i r a t i o n o t t h e c ne y e a r 
. suspens ion or Respondent * a l i c e n s e t o p r a c t i c e as i c e r t i f i e d 
s o c i a l worker M:*sp -aidant mav pi ini- a t in in tnpinoy , <MLniq LUL way 
not engage in p i i w t e p r a c t i c e , The o r d e r a p p e a r s t o l e a v e ' h i s 
p r o h i b i t i o n permanent However t h e r e m a i n d e r of t h e Order appeal a 
MI f aapppd RHspunnt in , j p.:enia< a anal pi a i IIMI UII p t o b a t i o u l o i a 
c e r t a i n l e n g t h ot t imo , a u b j e c t t o c e r t a i n t e rms and c o n d i t i o n s , 
a l t h o u g h such a c t i o n s a r e p r o p e r , t h e p r o h i b i t i o n aqa ina t , n o" -
I raio i <, j jqia a« >' Mi | < »r in niorit "i o p e n - e n d e d . Thet e ioiue, 
pci ragraph 5 o t t h e o r d e r i s m o d i f i e d so a s t o make t h e p r o h i b i t i o n 
a g a i n s t p r i v a t e p r a c t i c e l e s s i n d e f i n i t e or opt. n •••ended. 
ORDER 
__L iw nerebv ' ~~'"if"irrM *~'u *^ 
1. a aw are modi tied by striking the 
following per: : aa rcunc " ^uge 11 of the Findings, Conclusions 
and Order: 
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3iven ".3 :vp~:idency :i Respondent as i u s 
thera r : *- " .ua 
. wev^r the o"hanc?d d^rendency created by the 
nature i Mat* au i t a rmu -wreeironr WM - a r r^r-^ " 
. : - ; I - i u i i i ] i L i ; i , 
... : * "hLit . • . « ni ^» I L ^ I a s : 
WHEREFOFF; . r I^ IrDFRED trvr ^r 'Tdei:- • ^ er.ser J 
p r a r t : : . , . 
] ~s I intra ! " K*7^ -rr i; "p"^r -.-•=• *" ' ar^rc^^ent antra*" a; 
a. a J..-- : ' I'J I icerises 
. ..asp-.iatrj , i fix i- i ;n raati ua : * 2:. . . aced on probation, 
.rice: * : - ' -r^ "* - ^ '*:fi'-^ ^ reinbexuw. 
. . J , usoensinn, t*he revocations sha l l 
remain .a.ayea ana f-espcrcie: • . .i;3n:-es . .meet to probati on 
tor up io three (3) year- ii"'i ' i 
-
 ,
')iid] t lulu-: i 
I Respondent, sha. ctava . adiviiua, neiaa / 
troin eitnei a psycnoiogisa. psychiatrist . r . :a: . . 
social wc;.rker who has been Incensed :.;: that capaciy an.3 
continuous Ja: :o emploved for ..t least the last :':ve - ; 
years. At 1 minimum, such therapy sha_i address 
Respondent' a ethical violations her responsibility ~~~ 
that conauct 1 he manner in waa ;n her codependencv 
have contributed to her misconduct and proper prcrectu: * ; 
necessar- to manao^ : r]ipnt/th^rapi^r re]r--::" :- . 
witnia t;iii.„? i,\w ;ays from the ajce • 1 ill? 
Order, Respondent shall aubmit the name of the above-
reference- i therapist tar Board review and approval. If 
the Boar a 'ioes not approve, then Respondent shall 
promptly submit another name until the Board approves, 
Thereafter, Respondent shall commence therapy and 
Respondent^:, therapist shall submit written reports to 
the Boaa-- *• "-*-" - fM month, • .a:i ft 1 he nature of 
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therapy provided to Respondent and her progress i n tl lat 
regard. Respondent shall execute a written consent and 
release if necessary, so as to allow her therapist to 
disclose such matters to the Board. Therapy shall 
continue until such time as Respondent's therapist 
informs the Board that therapy is no longer warranted and 
the Board recommends that therapy may cease, or until the 
expiration of the three years' probationary period, 
whi chever occurs fi rst , 
3 . Respondent shall meet with the Board during the 
next regularly scheduled Board meeting held after this 
Order becomes effective. Thereafter, Respondent shall 
meet with the Board every' six (6) months during the term 
of suspension and probation. The frequency of such 
mee t ings may be subs equent J y modi f i ed, a s deemed 
warranted by the Board 
4 Respondent sha11 comp1e te conrsework whi ch 
addresses the subjects of professional values and ethics, 
DSM-III, human growth and development, and clinical 
practice procedures. Within thirty (30) days from the 
date this Order becomes effective, Respondent shall 
submit an education program for Board review and 
approval, which provides a minimum of nine (9) quarter 
hours to be completed in that respect: 
5. Uui jjiy the three -year probationary period, and 
unless the Board finds that Respondent is not meeting the 
terms and conditions of probation (which finding the 
Board may make in an informal proceeding) , Respondent may 
practice , as a certified social worker in an agency 
setting, but may not engage 2 n private practice. 
Respondent's employment shall be subject to supervision 
by a\licensed, clinical social worker. Respondent shall 
provide prior written notice to the Board of any si ich 
employment and her prospective supervisor in that regard. 
Upon Board review and approval., such employment may 
commence and Respondent's supervisor shall submit \ /ri ttieii 
reports to the Board every six (6) months as"" to the 
nature of Respondent's duties and her performance in that 
regard. 
Should Respondent fail ' cmp] with the above-stated 
terms a**.- nd •* 1 J;- ir^ prv.T:c-.e ^riate any statute ::>i: in :i ] e 
\/ . . . _ orker ii 1 tl: le State of 
IP 5,; rtne: ; rcceedinaj , :ia. . re conducted and a 
determination made whether the stay snail be rescinded and the 
revocation or Respondent '" 1 ir-rn » Inl 1 1 ^ >^^
 f-if>( M •» , 
2. In* * i I ti\t -jat e t^ t ho oidei IL ten dayu from the ddie this 
order on review is issued. 
Dated this _J^L l^r flf ^n ' . 
David L. Buhler, Executive Director 
Department *" '^nmerce 
NOTICE C iF RIGI IT OF J U DICIAL REVIEW 
Judicial review of this Order may be obtained by filing a 
Petition for Review within thirty (30) days after the issuance of 
this Order. Any Petition for such Review shall comply with the 
requirements set forth i n Section 63-46b-14 and Section 63-46b 16. 
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